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 Legitimacy and Protection Against Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination Under Title VII  
MATT SNODGRASS* 
Until relatively recently federal courts have held that claims of discrimination 
based in sexual orientation fall beyond the purview of Title VII protection. Even after 
the landmark holding in Price Waterhouse that recognized discrimination based in 
sex stereotypes and subsequent amendment to Title VII, courts resisted “bootstrap-
ping” sexual orientation claims with sex discrimination claims.1 The result has been 
a number of puzzling outcomes—for example, extending Title VII protection to gay 
men who received adverse employment treatment due to stereotypically “effemi-
nate” mannerism but not to gay men who meet cultural standards of masculinity—
rigidly applying the structure of protected categories in Title VII.2  
The tide may be turning on this trend. Following the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission’s (EEOC) decision to recognize sexual orientation discrimination 
as sex discrimination,3 a number of cases emerged, claiming discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation under Title VII.4 The real tension in this new effort to 
reconsider sexual orientation as a protected status does not lie in the legal reasoning 
that it requires. This has been relatively clear and has received a fair amount of at-
tention since the Court passed down its decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.5 
The tension lies in the fact that Congress has considered adding sexual orientation to 
Title VII numerous times in the past decade, but the supporters of the addition have 
failed to gain passage.6 While public support for protecting homosexuality under 
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 1. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 
3, 2016), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 11, 2016), and on reh'g en banc sub nom. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017); Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for 
Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715 (2014). 
 2. Soucek, supra note 1, at 748. 
 3. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 
15, 2015). At the moment, the Trump administration’s EEOC is still taking form. Alison 
Frankel, EEOC Back Gay Employee in Latest Appellate Battle Over Workplace Rights, 
REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-titlevii/eeoc-
backs-gay-employee-in-latest-appellate-battle-over-workplace-rights-idUSKCN1GS2M9 
[https://perma.cc/5GMQ-3RR7]. The possibility remains, though, that, as the Justice 
Department did in its decision on school bathrooms, the Trump administration EEOC may 
reverse course on its interpretation of sex discrimination in Baldwin. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/page/file/942021/download [https://perma.cc/T4YU-7E22].  
 4. See, e.g., Hively, 830 F.3d 698; Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 
F. Supp. 3d, 1334, 1347 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (finding that a sexual orientation discrimination 
claim was actionable under Title VII); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 
1194 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (finding that sexual orientation, to the extent it is perceived as a 
deviation from heterosexuality as a gender norm, is actionable under Title VII). 
 5. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 6. Ed O’Keefe, ENDA Explained, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/11/04/what-is-the-employment-non-
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Title VII has been strong for more than twenty years,7 and the legal reasoning sup-
porting extension of Title VII to sexual orientation is evident in legal precedent,8 
many would consider judicial extension of Title VII to sexual orientation protection 
a usurpation of legislative authority.9 
This Note examines the implications of judicially extending Title VII protection 
to claims of sexual orientation and concludes that doing so constitutes a legitimate, 
if not ideal interpretation. This examination will take place in three parts. Part I in-
cludes a review of the history of Title VII as it concerns sexual orientation discrimi-
nation and its current status. Part II then quickly suggests the method that the Court 
could use for extending Title VII, consistent with the plain language and apparent 
congressional intent. Finally, Part III analyzes the implications for the legitimacy of 
the Court in recognizing sexual orientation discrimination through the lenses of the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty and statutory corollaries to the living constitution and 
originalism. In conclusion, I will suggest that viewed through these lenses, a judicial 
extension of Title VII to include sexual orientation would be viewed as legitimate 
and not as the usurpation that has concerned many courts.  
I. TITLE VII, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND THE PATH TO BALDWIN V. FOXX 
This Part contains three subparts, which describe the three historical phases of 
Title VII interpretation. It begins with early application of Title VII, then discusses 
changes in interpretation brought on by the Price Waterhouse and other Supreme 
Court decisions. The Part, then, concludes with recent developments in Title VII in-
terpretation in the wake of the EEOC’s recognition of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion in Baldwin v. Foxx. 
A. Early Title VII Interpretations  
There is no question that early in the law’s existence, the agency responsible for 
implementing Title VII and the courts that interpreted it viewed sexual orientation to 
be beyond the law’s scope. The EEOC found, in an early decision under Title VII, 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear sexual orientation discrimination claims because 
sexual orientation did not appear as a protected class in the statute.10 Based on the 
evidence in the congressional record, the EEOC determined that Congress intended 
the term “sex” to refer exclusively to a person’s gender.11 At the time, the EEOC, 
and a number of courts reviewing the question of sexual orientation under Title VII 
                                                                                                             
 
discrimination-act-enda [https://perma.cc/7NAX-UKLZ]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Hively, 830 F.3d at 704 (noting that the Price Waterhouse decision permitted 
successful claims by LBGT plaintiff). 
 9. This is, primarily, the concern underlying judicial efforts to avoid “bootstrapping” 
sexual orientation discrimination claims with sex stereotyping claims. See Zachary R. Herz, 
Price's Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE 
L.J. 396, 423 (2014); Soucek, supra note 1, at 748. 
 10. EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 1975 WL 4475, at *3 (1975) (finding that the commission 
is without jurisdiction over claims of discrimination based on sexual practices). 
 11. Id. at *2. 
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concluded that the legislative history provided little useful information about how 
the term sex should be interpreted.12 Finding no help in the legislative history, the 
EEOC and the courts determined that Congress must have intended the word “sex” 
to have its obvious meaning.13 Had it intended otherwise, they reasoned, there surely 
would be some indication in the record. This view corresponds well with the popular 
understanding of sex discrimination underlying Title VII at the time of its passage, 
which was narrowly limited to facial disparities in employment opportunities be-
tween men and women and not more subtle forms of sex discrimination.14  
Several cases decided in the mid-1970s contained similar logic in refusing to pro-
tect sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. A district court in 
Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of an employer who refused to hire a 
male applicant who seemed too “effeminate,” finding that Congress did not intend 
for Title VII protection to extend to “affectational or sexual preference.”15 Similarly, 
a California district court simply dismissed a claim of discrimination due to homo-
sexuality as failing to state a claim under Title VII.16 Like the EEOC’s finding, these 
decisions reflected predominate beliefs about the nature and character of sex discrim-
ination and saw Title VII as an effort only to prevent men from achieving greater 
employment opportunities than women, simply due to gender preferences.17  
Throughout the late 1980s, lower courts regarded it as settled law that Title VII 
did not provide sex discrimination protection. In 1979, for example, the Fifth Circuit 
gave the issue no legal consideration when it affirmed a district court decision in 
favor of an employer charged with firing an employee because of sexual orienta-
tion.18 The court tersely noted that, “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited 
by Title VII.”19 In a 1989 case, the Eighth Circuit similarly concluded its discussion 
on the matter, flatly stating, “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against ho-
mosexuals.”20 
B. Price Waterhouse and Sex Stereotyping 
A shift away from the strict, category-driven, interpretation of Title VII began 
with the Court’s landmark decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. While the Price 
                                                                                                             
 
 12. Id. at *1. See also DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979), 
abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Congress has 
not shown any intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning.” (quoting 
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977))); Smith v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(finding the intent of the Civil Rights Act was to prohibit discrimination between men and 
women in job opportunities). 
 13. EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 1975 WL 4475, at *2; see Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1101. 
 14. Herz, supra note 9, at 404. 
 15. Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1101. 
 16. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. C76 1083 SW, 1976 WL 653, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 7, 1976), aff'd, 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 17. Herz, supra note 9, at 424. 
 18. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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Waterhouse Court based its decision in the traditional category of “discrimination 
because of sex,” two important holdings in the case opened the door for a potentially 
broader interpretation of what “discrimination because of sex” actually means.21 
Often, an adverse employment decision does not have a single impetus. The Price 
Waterhouse court found that in mixed-motive cases, where a permissible and poten-
tially impermissible cause for the employment decision exist, the plaintiff does not 
have to show “but for” causation.22 It is only necessary for the plaintiff to demon-
strate that sex played a role in the employment decision, at which point the defendant 
can only avert liability by proving that it would have taken the same action if it had 
not impermissibly taken sex into account.23 
Additionally, and most important for potential inclusion of sexual orientation 
claims, the Court based its finding of discrimination on the defendant’s use of sex 
stereotyping in withholding promotion.24 Price Waterhouse did not decline to make 
Hopkins a partner simply because she was a woman. The Court found that it did so 
because Hopkins was a woman who failed to meet her employer’s expectations about 
women. For example, the partner who explained the company’s decision advised 
Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”25 Another suggested that 
Hopkins take “a course at charm school.”26 The Court concluded, based on these and 
other remarks, that the company had used sex as a factor in its decision about whether 
or not to extend partnership to Ann Hopkins.27 This holding recognized that sex dis-
crimination means more than simple disparate treatment.28 It encompasses use of 
stereotypes and gender roles in making employment decisions.29 
The Court’s 1996 decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc. staked 
out additional territory in the “because of sex” category in Title VII. The Court 
squarely held in Oncale that Title VII does not bar a sex discrimination claim simply 
because the plaintiff and defendant are members of the same sex.30 In so doing, 
Justice Scalia noted that preventing or remedying male-on-male sexual harassment 
could not have been Congress’s principal motivation in including sex in Title VII. 
However, he observed that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil 
to cover reasonably comparable evils.”31 This of course is only dicta, but Justice 
Scalia remarkably treated Title VII as a somewhat flexible tool for addressing dis-
crimination, asserting that “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
                                                                                                             
 
 21. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 22. Id. at 241–42. 
 23. Id. at 242. 
 24. Id. at 250–51. 
 25. Id. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. 
Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 26. Id. at 258. 
 27. Id. at 295. 
 28. See Herz, supra note 9, at 403. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII's prohibition 
of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ protects men as well as women . . . .”). 
 31. Id. at 79. 
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principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”32 He reasoned that, 
since Title VII prohibits sexual harassment as a form of discrimination, it must pro-
hibit it in every form.33 This carries potentially important implications for the scope 
of discrimination based on sex stereotyping.  
Additionally, in 1991, and largely in response to the Price Waterhouse decision, 
Congress amended Title VII, establishing an unlawful employment practice “when 
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”34 By adding motivation to discriminate as an illegal employ-
ment practice, Congress effectively codified the Price Waterhouse holding—that 
basing employment decisions on sex is impermissible no matter what other permis-
sible factors may also have played a role.35 However, it also extends it, making the 
motivation itself an illegal practice, without respect to outcomes.36 In fact, the legis-
lative history of the 1991 amendment shows that Congress removed earlier language 
that required a plaintiff to demonstrate that sex was a “contributing” factor to the 
current “motivating factor.”37 In making this change, Congress removed the impact 
requirement, making it illegal to use sex in employment decisions regardless of any 
actual outcomes.38  
After the decisions in Price Waterhouse and Oncale and the 1991 Title VII 
amendment, many courts began to develop a different approach to claims of sexual 
orientation discrimination under Title VII. In 1999, the First Circuit affirmed a dis-
trict court’s dismissal of a sexual orientation discrimination claim.39 On appeal, the 
plaintiff attempted to refashion the sexual orientation claim as sex stereotype dis-
crimination based on “co-workers mocking [of] his supposedly effeminate charac-
teristics.”40 The court rejected this argument because the plaintiff failed to raise it in 
the court below.41 But in so doing, the First Circuit acknowledged that a man can 
“ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he 
did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”42 The Second and Sixth 
Circuits arrived at similar conclusions, rejecting sex stereotyping arguments origi-
nally raised as sexual orientations claims because they were not properly raised at 
the trial level but opening the possibility that future plaintiffs could succeed in such 
an argument.43  
                                                                                                             
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 80 (“Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual 
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.”). 
 34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2012). 
 35. Herz, supra note 9, at 419. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 137 Cong. Rec. 28,665 (1991). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 40. Id. at 261. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at n.4. 
 43. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that sex 
stereotyping could extend to discrimination for failure to conform to traditional conceptions 
of masculinity but that knowledge of homosexuality alone does not meet such a requirement); 
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The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have also passed down judgments 
favorable to plaintiffs asserting sex stereotyping claims on the basis of gender non-
conformity.44 The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of an em-
ployer, finding that the harassment that the plaintiff suffered resulted from his 
coworkers’ perception of the plaintiff as feminine because the plaintiff wore an ear-
ring.45 The Ninth Circuit found that an openly homosexual restaurant employee 
raised a cognizable claim under Title VII, explicitly disregarding the plaintiff’s sex-
ual orientation and basing its finding on his claim of gender nonconformity.46  
Courts, to this point, though, have been reluctant to consider sexual orientation 
discrimination in and of itself as a form of sex stereotyping.47 In a number of cases, 
this has led courts to parse the various sources of alleged discrimination in an effort 
to determine whether sex stereotyping or sexual orientation truly served as the basis 
for the discrimination.48 
C. Baldwin v. Foxx and the EEOC’s Recognition of Sexual Orientation  
  Discrimination 
The most recent development in potential recognition of sexual orientation dis-
crimination in the workplace has emerged through the EEOC’s interpretation of Title 
VII sex discrimination and the explicit connection it has drawn between sex stereo-
typing and sexual orientation discrimination. Courts and commentators first took 
note of the EEOC’s change in direction in Macy v. Holder.49 There, the commission 
found the sex stereotyping theory “a valid method of establishing discrimination ‘on 
the basis of sex’ in scenarios involving transgender individuals.”50  
The EEOC extended this logic in Baldwin v. Foxx.51 In that decision, the commis-
sion decided, in no uncertain terms, that sexual orientation discrimination claims are 
                                                                                                             
 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to consider sex stereotyping 
claim because it was not raised in the district court but acknowledging that relief would be 
available on that basis). 
 44. See Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010); Prowel 
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 
F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. City of Belleville v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) and abrogated 
by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 45. Doe ex rel. Doe, 119 F.3d, at 580. 
 46. Rene, 305 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 1063 (finding that sexual orientation “neither provides or precludes a 
cause of action” under Title VII); Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292 (reversing summary judgment when 
review of the record found facts to create a reasonable question as to whether discrimination 
was based on gender nonconformity rather than sexual orientation). 
 48. See Soucek, supra note 1, at 760. 
 49. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 
2012). 
 50. Id. at *7. 
 51. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 
2015). 
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cognizable as sex discrimination under Title VII.52 The commission arrived at this 
decision, reasoning that discrimination based on sexual orientation is inextricably 
linked to assumptions and stereotypes about sex identity generally.53 This includes 
the sorts of discrimination that courts had previously acknowledged when they found 
that mannerisms often associated with homosexuality do not conform with gender 
norms.54 It also includes associational discrimination that occurs when employers 
discriminate against gay or lesbian employees because of who they date or marry.55 
Finally, because sexual orientation refers to the sex of the individuals to whom one 
is attracted, it fundamentally implicates sex stereotyping because the employee suf-
fers discrimination because he or she is romantically or sexually attracted to someone 
of the same sex contrary to popular norms and expectations.56  
The Seventh Circuit directly addressed the EEOC’s new position in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Community College and, in the initial panel decision, declined to apply it to a 
sexual orientation discrimination claim.57 In the panel opinion, Judge Rovner noted 
that the momentum behind LGBT rights in America makes it unlikely that the status 
quo on employment discrimination and sexual orientation will persist very long, but 
insisted that extension of Title VII protection to sexual orientation must wait for new 
legislation from Congress or a ruling from the Supreme Court.58  
The Seventh Circuit, then, granted rehearing en banc and largely adopted the 
EEOC’s reasoning in Baldwin in recognizing discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation as sex discrimination.59 The court based its decision on two principals. First, 
the court concluded that sexual orientation, on a comparative basis, is sex discrimi-
nation because, holding all factors constant and changing only the plaintiff’s sex, a 
woman who is attracted to other women, in contravention of gender stereotypes, 
would receive different treatment than a man who, in conformity with gender norms, 
is attracted to women.60 Second, the court finds associational discrimination because 
the alleged adverse employment decision reflects the employer’s disapproval of the 
sex of the individuals with whom the employee associates romantically.61 The court 
holds that both the comparative and associational claims constitute sex discrimina-
tion because in either situation, sex ultimately serves as the deciding factor.62 That is 
                                                                                                             
 
 52. Id. at *5. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *7. 
 55. Id. at *6. 
 56. Id. at *5. 
 57. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 
3, 2016), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 11, 2016), and on reh'g en banc sub nom. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 58. Id. at 718. 
 59. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (noting that Hively’s claim of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation constitutes a sex discrimination claim, in the first instance because it is based in 
gender nonconformity, and in the second, because it is based in the plaintiff’s associational 
choices). 
 60. Id. at 345–46. 
 61. Id. at 349. 
 62. Id. (“No matter which category is involved, the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff 
would not be suffering the adverse action had his or her sex, race, color, national origin, or 
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to say, had the employee’s sex been different, the employment decision also would 
have been different.  
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION COGNIZABLE UNDER TITLE VII 
While the prevailing application of Title VII to sex stereotyping claims provides 
a decent modicum of protection for lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees who suffer 
discrimination tied to gender nonconformity,63 it also presents logical gaps and in-
consistencies. Most prominent among these is the fact that plaintiffs who more no-
ticeably and physically do not conform to gender norms and stereotypes tend to have 
much greater success under Title VII than those who are simply known to be gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual.64 This follows rather naturally from the language and traditional 
application of Title VII. The text of the law prohibits discrimination based on sex, 
and it does not feature any protection for discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.65 Since sex stereotyping is the theory available to victims of sexual orientation 
discrimination, those who can present clear, visible, and perceptible divergence from 
gender norms allow courts to clearly distinguish between a class named in the statute, 
sex, through gender nonconformity, and one that is not, homosexuality.66  
Yet this approach to discrimination claims presents meaningful concerns under 
Title VII. First, it represents a significant departure from standard application of dis-
crimination law.67 This is because courts reviewing gender nonconformity cases in-
sist on confining their review to a plaintiff’s characteristics that are observable on 
the job.68 Unlike other categories of discrimination featured in Title VII, in gender 
nonconformity cases, employers are permitted to make adverse employment deci-
sions based on an employee’s life outside of work.69 This is at odds with how the 
courts have dealt with, for example, sex discrimination against mothers who were 
perceived to be more likely to shirk work responsibilities to care for their children.70 
While that sort of discrimination is considered an impermissible stereotype, courts 
have, conversely, considered knowledge of a homosexual’s failure to conform to 
                                                                                                             
 
religion been different.” (emphasis in original)). 
 63. See Soucek, supra note 1, at 787 (suggesting that rather than renewing efforts to pass 
ENDA, the fact that some LGBT employees receive protection under Title VII sex stereotyp-
ing theory may lead to relaxation of efforts).  
 64. Id. at 748; see also Hively, 830 F.3d at 710 (noting that plaintiffs who “look, act, or 
appear to be gender non-conforming” obtain better results under Title VII than plaintiffs who 
do not exhibit gender nonconforming characteristics and experience discrimination because 
they are known or perceived to be homosexual). 
 65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2012) (making it impermissible to based employment 
decisions or to use as a motivating factor in employment decisions considerations of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
 66. See Soucek, supra note 1, at 748. 
 67. Id. at 766–68. 
 68. E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006); Soucek, supra 
note 1, at 766. 
 69. Soucek, supra note 1, at 766–67. 
 70. See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that denial 
of promotion based on a belief that mothers are less attentive to employment responsibilities 
is impermissible sex stereotyping).  
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gender stereotypes outside of the workplace a valid reason for employment discrim-
ination.71  
Second, while the distinction between gender nonconformity and sexual orienta-
tion provides a reasonable legal distinction, it raises questions about exactly why one 
form of discrimination should be protected and the other should not. This gets to the 
very heart of Title VII, and the goal of eliminating employment decisions based on 
immutable characteristics unrelated to job performance.72 With respect to race, for 
example, any type of racial consideration is impermissible, not just some of them. 
Discriminating against a black job applicant is just as illegal as discriminating against 
one who is Asian or Hispanic.73 If Title VII were to succeed with respect to race, race 
would lose all relevancy in the workplace.74 Sex stereotyping, as it applies to poten-
tial cases of sexual orientation discrimination, operates in reverse. Sexual orientation 
discrimination has become something of an affirmative defense for employers, who 
reduce their chances of an impermissible employment consideration by paying more 
attention to an employee’s sexual preferences.75 The incentive is to place more em-
phasis on the immutable characteristics rather than eliminating them from employ-
ment decisions.  
Sex stereotyping has a well-established place in the law as a theory of sex dis-
crimination. However, as the discussion in the preceding paragraphs demonstrates, 
its application to gender nonconformity claims with overlapping sexual orientation 
implications departs from normal Title VII review. The best way to resolve these 
issues is to adopt the EEOC’s approach in Baldwin v. Foxx.76 This is because, under 
the Baldwin approach, sexual orientation itself is the gender nonconforming charac-
teristic that forms the basis for an impermissible sex stereotype.77 Courts would no 
longer need to concern themselves with the observable mannerisms that have thus 
far made the difference between successful and unsuccessful claims because any em-
ployment decision based on sexual orientation is itself based on a sex stereotype, and 
employers no longer could use private behavior in employment decisions. In the 
same way, using the Baldwin approach would eliminate employers’ incentives to 
make their decisions based on immutable characteristics. Both the visible, gender 
nonconforming homosexual employee, and the gender-conforming employee who is 
only known to be homosexual would receive the same protection under Title VII.  
The Seventh Circuit followed this approach in Hively when it found that discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation is, itself, sex discrimination.78 Closely track-
ing the reasoning of Baldwin, if not explicitly, the court concluded that comparative 
                                                                                                             
 
 71. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (finding that coworkers’ notions about and employee’s 
sexual practices that occurred outside of the workplace that did not conform to gender 
stereotypes did not implicate Title VII protection). 
 72. See Soucek, supra note 1, at 770–73. 
 73. Id. at 769–70. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 771. 
 76. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 77. Supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 78. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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and associational discrimination are sex discrimination because they require an ac-
counting of the employee’s sex when making the employment decision.79 This ap-
proach eliminates the inconsistencies of the prevailing application of Title VII sex 
discrimination to claims of gender nonconformity when sexual orientation is in-
volved.  
III. PROTECTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION UNDER TITLE VII AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 
This Note, so far, has focused on the status of sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII, the logical inconsistencies in Title VII’s application to those claims, 
and the best methods for addressing those inconsistencies. Though adoption of the 
EEOC’s approach would be a natural extension of Title VII precedent and serve to 
resolve inconsistencies in the current approach,80 doing so would still represent a 
significant move for the court on a statutory issue that raises important questions 
about the legitimacy of such a decision. This Part addresses the legitimacy question 
from two perspectives, the counter-majoritarian difficulty as well as statutory ver-
sions of common law constitutionalism and originalism. Through these lenses, I will 
argue that judicially extending Title VII protection to include sexual orientation 
would be momentous and, ultimately, can be viewed as legitimate.  
A. Sexual Orientation in Title VII and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty 
The counter-majoritarian difficulty has attracted consistent attention from consti-
tutional scholars since it emerged in the literature more than fifty years ago.81 It raises 
questions about the legitimacy of judicial review when unelected federal judges uni-
laterally invalidate a law that popularly elected legislators have enacted.82 In this 
way, a nondemocratic branch of government effectively overrides the will of the 
people reflected in the acts of a democratically appointed legislature.83 
While the inclusion of sexual orientation protection in Title VII would not inval-
idate an act of Congress, it raises the same concerns because it adds protection that 
Congress did not explicitly include in the statute. This could be considered a usurpa-
tion of the democratic process by a nondemocratic branch. However, there are three 
reasons that judicial inclusion of sexual orientation protection in Title VII should be 
considered legitimate as it concerns the counter-majoritarian difficulty. First, inclu-
sion of sexual orientation in Title VII may not be “counter-majoritarian” at all be-
cause the public has consistently expressed support for protecting gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual citizens from employment discrimination.84 Second, there is good evidence 
to indicate that extension of Title VII to include sexual orientation at this point in 
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history would be a relatively normal and predictable action for the judiciary to take.85 
Finally, since this is not a constitutional issue, Congress and the people will have an 
opportunity to reverse judicial decisions to recognize sexual orientation discrimina-
tion under Title VII if it does not comport with the will of the people.86  
1. Popular Support for Sexual Orientation Protection in Title VII 
The status of sexual orientation in Title VII at this juncture in history, to some 
extent, turns the counter-majoritarian difficulty on its head. Employment protection 
for lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees has garnered consistent popular support 
over the years, yet Congress has consistently failed to amend Title VII to include the 
protection.87 In one poll conducted by Greenberg, Quinlin, Rosner on behalf of the 
Human Rights Campaign, sixty-nine percent of likely voters indicated that they 
would support a federal nondiscrimination act that prevents employment discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation.88 Even more tellingly, a 2013 poll for Americans 
for Workplace Opportunity leading up to a 2013 Senate vote on employment non-
discrimination found that a majority of American’s assumed that such a law already 
existed.89 That fifty-state survey revealed majority backing throughout the country, 
with Nebraska registering the lowest support for employment nondiscrimination at 
fifty-seven percent.90  
These figures should not come as a surprise given the steady normalization and 
acceptance of homosexuality in our society.91 In fact, twenty-two states and the 
District of Columbia have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation.92 Support for employment nondiscrimination for gays and lesbians 
actually appears to have gained traction in American society much earlier than mar-
riage equality. In 1994, a poll by Time and CNN found that sixty-two percent of 
Americans support laws that “protect ‘homosexuals’ against job discrimination.”93 
In that year, a solid majority of Americans still opposed recognition of same sex 
marriage.94  
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Yet, Congress has consistently failed to perform its majoritarian function on this 
issue. Since 1994, and most recently in 2013, an employment nondiscrimination law 
has come before Congress eight times.95 Each time it has failed, and five times the 
legislation never passed through committee for a floor vote.96 Given relatively strong 
public support for sexual orientation protection in Title VII and the failure of 
Congress to implement it, it would be hard to consider judicial inclusion of sexual 
orientation protection “counter-majoritarian.” 
2. Federal Courts During Political Gridlock 
While the failure to pass employment nondiscrimination spans more than two 
decades, now, the current impasse comes in the midst of a more systematic political 
stalemate. Anecdotal evidence of the relative inability of the political branches to 
produce meaningful legislation abounds. Beginning in the summer of 2011, the debt 
ceiling, which previously received little, if any, attention in the media, became a reg-
ular political issue.97 Law makers’ inability to come to an agreement led Standard & 
Poor’s to lower the United States’ credit rating in August of 201198 and eventually 
culminated in government shut down in October of 2013.99 In 2015, Congress passed 
its first budget in six years,100 and although Republicans control both houses, 
Congress could only manage a continuing resolution for fiscal year 2017.101 
Under prevailing political conditions, members of Congress have been unable to 
translate the popular will of the American people into effective legislation. This state 
of congressional “gridlock” or “stalemate” occurs from time to time for a number of 
reasons and creates opportunities for an expanded policy role for the judiciary. 
Robert Dahl, for example, suggested that a lack of prevailing or dominant political 
coalition would lead to a relatively inactive legislature, permitting courts to pursue a 
more independent policy program.102 Mark Tushnet conceives of this phenomenon 
slightly differently, noting that divided government may prevent Congress from 
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building sufficient support for legislation in response to judicial decisions.103 Others 
have noted that very strong party unity can function like divided and gridlocked gov-
ernment because members are less willing to move across the ideological divide and 
support another party’s legislation.104 Sarah Binder of the Brookings Institution, for 
example, conducted a quantitative analysis on the most recent Congresses and con-
cluded that gridlock primarily emerges during periods of heightened party polariza-
tion.105 This provides courts with more freedom to exercise policy preferences.106  
Dahl asserted that our government, broadly speaking, is composed of “relatively 
cohesive alliances that endure for long periods of time.”107 According to Dahl, the 
Supreme Court exists within the prevailing governing alliance, which sets the rough 
boundaries for Court decisions.108 The Court, then, has a unique policymaking role 
that remains legitimate to the extent that its statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tions fall reasonably within the “basic policy goals of the dominant alliance.”109 Its 
legitimacy may falter when those decisions oppose the policy goals of the governing 
alliance.110  
The takeaway from Dahl’s analysis is that the Court has very little independent 
policy-making discretion under normal circumstances. It will render decisions pro-
moting the views of the dominant alliance or risk losing credibility and legitimacy as 
an institution. Dahl notes that, from time to time, though, the governing coalition will 
become unstable in certain policy areas, allowing the Court to independently institute 
its own policies.111 In particular, Dahl notes that the Court will not exist within an 
alliance, and will have greater policy latitude, during periods of transition between 
one governing coalition and the next.112 Dahl points out that this is likely the expla-
nation for the Court’s success in promoting civil rights in the period leading up to 
the Brown decision.113 
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Tushnet emphasizes that the Supreme Court has latitude to create policy that its 
majority favors during times of divided government.114 When different parties con-
trol the presidency and at least one house of Congress, the Court’s decisions on stat-
utory issues will prevail if at least a third of representatives or senators support it 
because it takes two-thirds of elected law makers to either pass a veto, proof law, or 
overcome a veto if an initial bill gets passed.115 
While the scenarios that Dahl and Tushnet describe leave room for independent 
action on the part of the Court during unstable periods, in the absence of political 
cohesion, others have noted that very strong unity within the political branches may 
present the Court with an opportunity to promote its own policies.116 This is because 
Congress and the President rely upon new legislation to counter judicial decisions 
inconsistent with their own goals. However, even if a majority of both houses and 
the President oppose a decision, Senate filibuster rules make it very difficult to pass 
cloture and bring a bill to a vote. It has been more than thirty years since either party 
held the sixty seats necessary in the Senate to break a filibuster.117 As a result, normal 
Senate rules may insulate judicial decisions that contravene the will of the prevailing 
alliance when political unity is strong and no members of the minority party are will-
ing to cross the aisle and vote for cloture.118 
Other observers suggest that, in fact, cooperation between the majorities in the 
political branches and the judiciary may create an environment that allows the judi-
ciary to pursue its policy agenda.119 Mark Graber notes that the governing alliance 
may actually look to the courts to rule on a matter when addressing the issue in the 
political environment could upset the majority coalition.120 This arrangement gives 
courts some autonomy in deciding the issue and shields political actors from a messy 
public disagreement.121 Keith Whittington suggests that a similar dynamic may also 
provide the court leeway in making policy when a governing coalition hopes to over-
come an entrenched interest resistant to change that a prevailing alliance favors or 
when federalism prevents a national coalition from addressing disfavored state poli-
cies.122 In any of these scenarios, the judiciary essentially takes the invitation to make 
policy on an issue that the governing alliance cannot reach or would prefer not to 
address.123  
There are a number of normal and predictable political scenarios, then, in which 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty may actually function in reverse, including the 
current period of heightened political polarization and legislative gridlock. The 
branch of government that is responsible for representing the will of the people, 
Congress, is unable to address many of the electorate’s concerns. As a result, the 
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federal courts may end up creating protection for sexual orientation under Title VII 
in the absence of congressional action. The environment in which such a decision 
would arise should ease counter-majoritarian concerns. Given the structural dynam-
ics at work, this type of decision should be considered a normal and predictable 
event, at least in certain circumstances. 
3. Congress Can Reverse the Judiciary on Statutory Matters 
It appears, then, that judicially extending Title VII protection to sexual orientation 
discrimination would comport with the popular will of the people and the function 
of courts during times of political gridlock. However, Congress still holds the final 
say in legislative matters. As it did in 1991, following the Price Waterhouse decision, 
Congress can pass legislation to clarify the application of a court opinion to the 
law;124 or, if the public and the legislature simply disagree with the outcome, 
Congress can pass a law reversing it. In this way, the majoritarian structure of the 
constitution remains intact in matters of judicial review and statutory interpretation. 
B. Sexual Orientation Protection Under Title VII Viewed from the Perspectives of 
Common Law Constitutionalism and Originalism 
Popular support, of course, is not the only basis for legitimacy. This part will re-
view the prospect of judicial extension of Title VII to include sexual orientation from 
the perspective of common law constitutionalism and originalism. At the outset, it is 
worth noting that these are theories of constitutional, not statutory, interpretation. 
However, the concepts that form the basis of each theory can easily translate to stat-
utory interpretation. I will continue to use “common law approach” or “common law 
tradition” to refer to the common law or living constitution approach to interpretation 
and “originalism” or “original intent” to refer to originalism. Review under each ap-
proach will demonstrate that extension of Title VII to include sexual orientation can 
be viewed as a legitimate judicial act. 
1. The Common Law Approach 
The common law approach is closely associated with living constitutionalism, 
which conceives of a constitution that changes to meet societal, technological, or 
economic changes that the framers of the constitution could not have predicted.125 In 
the common law tradition, then, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in-
terpret constitutional provisions through analysis of previous decisions interpreting 
that provision.126 One could not hope to understand what “equal protection under the 
law” means, for example, without consulting decisions interpreting that phrase. 
Common law constitutionalism is attractive because it permits courts to adapt the 
law to current conditions without the requirement of a constitutional amendment.127 
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This does not simply mean constitutional amendment by fiat, though. The common 
law tradition acknowledges that concepts and terms that had a particular meaning at 
the time the Constitution was written may mean something different in a modern 
society.128 
This method of interpretation can also apply to statutory interpretation, and the 
EEOC’s proposed use of Title VII to protect against sexual orientation discrimination 
illustrates common law statutory interpretation as well.129 In 1964, when Title VII 
first went into effect, discrimination as a concept and the reality of sex discrimination 
in the workplace were very different than what we see today. In 1964, discrimination 
based on sex really applied to ascriptive sexism.130 At its inception, the law was pri-
marily concerned with categorical disparities between men and women in the work-
force.131 Sexism today is not often so overt and easy to identify.132 The Price 
Waterhouse decision acknowledged this reality to some extent when it identified the 
discriminatory effect of sex stereotyping and the possibility that an adverse employ-
ment decision may be based on both permissible and impermissible factors.133 
The EEOC was careful to note in its decisions in Macy and Baldwin that protec-
tion for transgender individuals and homosexuals does not add a category to the Title 
VII framework.134 That is clearly a legislative function. Protection for sexual orien-
tation, as the EEOC explained, updates the statutory interpretation to match society’s 
current understanding of what gender, sex, and workplace discrimination actually 
mean in daily life.135 Perhaps Judge Posner articulated the common law approach 
addressed to sex discrimination most directly in concurring with the majority opinion 
in Hively:  
I would prefer to see us acknowledge openly that today we, who are 
judges rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century-
old statute a meaning of “sex discrimination” that the Congress that en-
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acted it would not have accepted. This is something courts do fairly fre-
quently to avoid statutory obsolescence and concomitantly to avoid plac-
ing the entire burden of updating old statutes on the legislative branch.136 
While protection against sexual orientation discrimination may appear on its face 
to simply add a new class to Title VII, under the common law tradition, it would be 
a logical application of precedent interpreting sex discrimination to a different set of 
legal facts.137 Protection of sexual orientation under Title VII, then, seems to be ra-
ther natural and certainly legitimate when viewed from the common law perspective. 
2. Originalism and Sexual Orientation Under Title VII 
Proponents of originalism will likely find protection for sexual orientation in Title 
VII much less natural than advocates of the common law tradition. We should 
acknowledge up front, in fact, that a true originalist would almost certainly decline 
to apply the EEOC’s approach to sexual orientation and Title VII in the absence of a 
statutory amendment. However, there is still a good argument to be made for the 
legitimacy of sexual orientation protection under Title VII on originalist grounds. 
While an originalist would probably not choose to implement the EEOC’s approach, 
he or she may still find reason to accept its implementation as legitimate. 
Originalism looks to the meaning of the text as it was understood at the time it 
was written.138 This approach was on display when the Supreme Court incorporated 
Second Amendment rights in District of Columbia v. Heller.139 There, Justice Scalia 
went to great lengths to demonstrate what the words of the Second Amendment 
would have meant to the people of postcolonial America at the time it was written.140 
Judge Sykes succinctly articulated the originalist approach to statutory interpretation 
in her dissent in Hively: “When a statute supplies the rule of decision, our role is to 
give effect to the enacted text, interpreting the statutory language as a reasonable 
person would have understood it at the time of enactment.”141  
This approach is reflected in the early interpretations of Title VII. When the 
EEOC probed the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and found no 
grounds to give the term “sex” anything other than its common meaning, it based its 
decision on an originalist interpretation.142 Similarly, the Blum and De Santis courts 
relied on originalist interpretations of Title VII, focusing exclusively on the common 
meaning of the classes listed in the statute.143 
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While the text of Title VII itself leaves little room for interpretation as to the 
meaning of “sex,” the 1991 amendment to Title VII as well as legislative history 
surrounding recent attempts to pass employment nondiscrimination laws provides 
justification for inclusion of sexual orientation in Title VII that originalists may find, 
if not ultimately convincing, at least acceptable.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides the best basis for the legitimacy of sexual 
orientation protection in Title VII on originalism grounds. This legislation came al-
most immediately in the wake of the Price Waterhouse decision. Three important 
things happened as part of the 1991 amendment. First, Congress did not repudiate 
the Price Waterhouse decision. This is significant because Price Waterhouse marked 
a relatively dramatic expansion of the potential scope of sex discrimination within 
Title VII.144 It, in fact, established a new form of recognized discrimination.145 By 
amending Title VII shortly after the landmark sex discrimination case and leaving 
the decision intact, Congress passed on the opportunity to repudiate Price 
Waterhouse, indicating that it did not view the decision as an invalid interpretation 
of the law.146  
Not only did Congress leave the Price Waterhouse decision intact, it expanded it 
to some extent by giving plaintiffs in discrimination cases a basis for recovery when 
bias motivated an employment decision.147 By changing the language from “contrib-
uted” to “motivated” Congress explicitly adopted the language from the Price 
Waterhouse opinion.148 This shifted the analysis from employment outcomes to eval-
uative criteria used in employment. Specifically, it appears that Congress changed 
the language to create a cause of action that focused on whether ideas about the 
proper roles of men and women play a role in an employer’s decisions.149 These 
factors mark a fairly strong endorsement of the underlying reasoning that the Price 
Waterhouse Court employed and its shift in focus toward implicit forms of discrim-
ination and harassment. 
Additionally, while Congress’s resistance to explicit statutory inclusion of les-
bian, gay, and bisexual employees as protected classes in Title VII could be inter-
preted as opposition to such protection, the Court’s approach to similar evidence in 
the past and the reasons that law makers have offered for declining to add additional 
classes to the statute caution against drawing that conclusion. First, the Supreme 
Court has declined to use failed attempts to amend a statute as a tool for interpreting 
that law.150 The Court has specifically noted that “[c]ongressional inaction lacks ‘per-
suasive significance’” due to the many alternative inferences that one could draw 
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from such an outcome.151 In the case of adding classes to Title VII to include sexual 
orientation protection, this appears to be exactly the case. The legislation enjoyed 
broad bipartisan support when Democrats reintroduced it in 2007.152 However, it ap-
pears that the addition of transgendered individuals as a class, alongside sexual ori-
entation protection, turned many law makers against it.153 Interpreting the recent fail-
ure to amend Title VII to explicitly include sexual orientation as a protected class, 
then, as congressional opposition to employment protection against sexual orienta-
tion discrimination would appear to be incorrect and meaningful to an originalist. 
Additionally, a number of legislators indicated during debate over the Employ-
ment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) in 2007 and 2013 their belief that such addi-
tional statutory language was unnecessary because Title VII already included sexual 
orientation protection.154 Speaker Boehner consistently asserted his belief that 
ENDA was unnecessary because such workplace protection already existed.155 In 
both of the most recent attempts to pass ENDA, members of Congress declined to 
support the bill because they believed Title VII already prohibited discrimination 
against LGBT persons.156 Given that the Price Waterhouse theory of sex stereotyping 
is the only protection that LGBT employees have available under Title VII, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that members of Congress opposed to ENDA have endorsed 
application of Price Waterhouse to claims of sexual orientation discrimination.157 
Based on the reaction in Congress to the Price Waterhouse decision and the many 
members of Congress who express their belief that Title VII already protects against 
sexual orientation discrimination, express extension of such protection by the judici-
ary could be viewed as legitimate on originalist grounds.  
CONCLUSION 
As Judge Rovner wrote in the initial panel decision for Hively, “[i]t seems unlikely 
that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be 
fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, de-
moted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based 
on who they date, love, or marry.”158 Indeed, it seems almost certain that the contra-
dictions in the application of sex stereotyping to sexual orientation and gender non-
conformity cases will become too obvious to ignore and that the momentum behind 
LGBT rights in our country will eventually usher in a change in Title VII protection. 
Yet there is a real question as to whether Congress will be able to amend the law to 
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include explicit sexual orientation protection. The reasoning from Price Waterhouse 
and the EEOC’s application of it in Baldwin as employed by the Hively court create 
a rational method for doing this. If sexual orientation finds sustained and sanctioned 
protection in Title VII through the courts rather than the legislature, that decision will 
rest on a legitimate basis in public opinion and in the law.  
  
 
